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Abstract 
A widespread view in physics holds that the implementation of time reversal in 
standard quantum mechanics must be given by an anti-unitary operator. In 
foundations and philosophy of physics, however, there has been some discussion 
about the conceptual grounds of this orthodoxy, largely relying on either its 
obviousness or its mathematical-physical virtues. My aim in this paper is to 
substantively change the traditional structure of the debate by highlighting the 
philosophical commitments underlying the orthodoxy. I argue that the persuasive 
force of the orthodoxy can benefit from a relational metaphysics of time and a 
by-stipulation view on symmetries. Within such philosophical background, I 
submit, the orthodoxy of time reversal in standard quantum mechanics could find 
a fertile terrain to lay the groundwork for a more thorough conceptual 
justification. 
Keywords: quantum mechanics, time reversal, anti-unitarity, relationalism, 
symmetry. 
1. Introduction 
What grounds the claim that a quantum physical system has been genuinely time reversed? 
Answers to this question fall in either of two sides. On the one hand, the overarching attitude 
(the orthodoxy, henceforth) points out that in order to reverse the dynamical evolution of a 
quantum system, an anti-unitary time-reversal operator must be given. On the other hand, 
some philosophers have lately argued that such orthodoxy might be challenged (Albert 2000, 
Callender 2000, Lopez 2019), which has paved the way for non-standard representations of 
time reversal in quantum mechanics (QM, henceforth), in general, in terms of a unitary 
implementation. 
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In one way or another, a thorough response to the opening question amounts to spelling 
the notion of time reversal out. This has led to a reinforcement of the orthodoxy by providing 
a precise mathematical tailoring of the implementation of time reversal as well as a more 
attentive philosophical refinement of its foundations (see, for instance, Sachs 1987, Earman 
2002, Roberts 2017, 2018). The orthodoxy has generally been defended as the only view that 
is philosophically and physically viable, centering its defense in showing that a non-standard 
implementation of time reversal (i.e., that provided by a unitary time-reversal operator) fails 
to deliver a workable mathematical transformation as well as a conceptually defensible 
notion of time reversal. So, the dispute has been mostly set in terms of a unitary versus an 
anti-unitary implementation of time reversal in QM, where the orthodoxy champions the 
latter, while non-standard views (or ‘heretic’ views), the former.  
Yet, I believe that the dispute between a unitary versus an anti-unitary implementation of 
time reversal is just the top of the iceberg in a series of philosophical and physical decisions 
that have to be made in order to conceptualize the idea of time reversal and to formally 
represent it. The bone of contention is not whether an anti-unitary implementation more 
genuinely represents time reversal simpliciter, but which concept of time reversal it intends 
to model mathematically, which are its philosophical assumptions, and whether they are 
tenable. In this sense, much of the persuasive force of the orthodoxy actually depends upon 
a philosophical background within which the anti-unitary implementation of time reversal 
makes sense more naturally. To thoroughly comprehend the nature of time reversal in QM is 
to bring to light such background. 
The aim of this paper is to substantively change the traditional structure of the debate by 
bringing to the forefront the philosophical background that more straightforwardly can 
support the orthodoxy. My approach to the debate seeks to identify such background and 
follow the trail of the series of assumptions that make the orthodoxy a defensible and 
attractive approach. This would not only strengthen its legitimacy but would also provide a 
more accurate picture of how complex the notion of time reversal is. Part of this complexity 
consists in the many unnoticed substantial philosophical assumptions that form the 
conceptual environment within which it has been developed. To begin, I will distinguish 
three steps in building up the notion of time reversal, both conceptually and formally. 
1. The mathematical tailoring, whereby the anti-unitary implementation comes out as 
the only fair modeling of time reversing a quantum system. 
2. The physical justification, which defends the anti-unitary implementation by 
stipulating the physical requirements for time reversing a quantum system. This step 
sets a physics-based concept of time reversal primarily grounded in the idea of 
‘backtracking’. 
3. The philosophical background, which lays the philosophical groundwork for such a 
physics-based concept of time reversal. This step justifies why the concept of time 
reversal is to be understood as the orthodoxy says it must be understood. 
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I will next show that there are two major arguments that physically support the orthodox 
understanding of time reversal in terms of backtracking, namely, (a) the two-time-evolution 
argument (or Wigner’s general criterion for time reversal), and (b) the Hamiltonian’s 
spectrum argument. The central claim of this article comes in after the physical justification 
is presented. I will argue that the philosophical background primarily consists in responding 
the two following questions: 
• What do we mean by time? 
• What status do we suppose that symmetries have in physics? 
Neither of these questions admits a univocal answer. The first question opens a metaphysical 
dimension in our understanding of time reversal. At this point, I will argue that temporal 
relationalism is a friendly metaphysical environment for the orthodoxy, motivating a 
functional reductionist approach to time reversal, whereby time reversal ought to be 
functionally reduced to motion reversal. The second question concerns whether time-reversal 
symmetry is to be conceived either as a by-stipulation or a by-discovery symmetry. I will 
argue that both the physical justification and the mathematical tailoring of the orthodoxy can 
conceptually benefit from taking time-reversal invariance as a by-stipulation symmetry.  
The upshot of the paper is, hence, that the orthodoxy should not be embraced because it 
is self-evident or analytically true, but because its persuasive force comes from a 
philosophical background that articulates extraordinarily well with the physics and the 
mathematics. This claim might be seen as a double-edged sword, since the philosophical 
background could now be challenged. Even though it might be seen as a more thorough 
justification of the orthodoxy, it might be also welcomed among those holding a heretic 
attitude, causing in the same proportion some discomfort among those defending the 
orthodoxy. It must be made clear, nonetheless, that it is not my intention to address this 
controversy here. Although I will occasionally bring the heretic view up as a counterpoint, I 
will align myself with the orthodoxy without putting it much into question. The philosophical 
exploration I pursue here homes in on why it is reasonable to side the orthodoxy, instead of 
showing it wrongheaded. 
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2, I will begin by briefly introducing 
the mathematical tailoring of the orthodoxy of time reversal in QM. I will also show here 
how a non-standard account can come up. In Section 3, I will expose in detail the two major 
arguments that physically supports the orthodoxy. In Section 4, I will provide the main 
arguments of the paper by offering the philosophical background the orthodoxy is framed 
within. It chiefly consists of two pillars –a metaphysical pillar (Section 4.1) and a heuristic-
epistemic one (Section 4.2.). Finally, concluding remarks. 
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2. The Mathematical Tailoring of the Orthodoxy 
In the Hamiltonian formulation of classical mechanics, the main features of the time-reversal 
transformation stem from an analysis of the physics of the simplest cases. So, the starting 
point is typically a particle moving on a line in a conservative field force. The state of the 
particle is given by two variables: the generalized coordinates 𝑞𝑖 and the conjugate momenta 
𝑝𝑖. A trajectory in the phase space will be described through a set of functions 𝑞𝑖(𝑡), 𝑝𝑖(𝑡), 





+ 𝑉(𝑥) (1) 
As 𝑉(𝑥) is constant and independent of time, it plays no role, and we can disregard it. In their 
most general expression, the Hamilton’s equations follow from a system’s Hamiltonian as 









In which way can the time-reversal transformation be implemented? The answer mostly 
depends on what time reversing a classical system means, conceptually. Even though there 
would be much to say here, the most common answer, and one that is quite easy to grasp, is 
that of a film played backward. So, by time reversing a classical system we mean to generate 
a transformation that retraces the trajectory of a system This is the guiding concept that we 
want to formally implement. Such an implementation is what I will call the ‘mathematical 
tailoring’, that is, the process whereby such a concept is formally modeled within a theory. 
To put it more accurately, it is the process whereby a mathematical representation is given 
the right sort of properties to capture what we conceptually mean by ‘time reversing’ within 
a physical theory. Canonically, the mathematical tailoring of time reversal in Hamiltonian 
classical mechanics involves a transformation 𝑇 such that reparametrizes the time coordinate, 
changes the sign of the 𝑝𝑖s, and leaves the 𝑞𝑖s unchanged. 
 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡 ;  𝑝𝑖 → −𝑝𝑖 ;  𝑞𝑖 → 𝑞𝑖 (3) 
In consequence, 𝑇 transforms the set of all smooth curves (𝑞(𝑡), 𝑝(𝑡)) through phase space. 
This transformation is directly related to a symmetry property of the Hamiltonian 
 𝐻(𝑞𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖) = 𝐻(𝑞𝑖 , −𝑝𝑖) (4) 
If a system’s Hamiltonian satisfies (4), then the equations of motion are invariant under T. 
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The shift to QM is not straightforward and requires some further formal work. Even 
though some features of time reversal will remain (or, better, will be required to remain), 
others will significantly change. The mathematical tailoring of the quantum time-reversal 
operator, hence, demands a series of assumptions and techniques that need to be detailed 
carefully. For this purpose, I will follow the traditional approach to the topic1, though my 
intention is to be crystal clear about the assumptions and the rationale upon which the 
mathematical tailoring relies. The justification of such assumptions is partially mathematical, 
but also physical and, ultimately, philosophical. I will exclusively focus on the mathematical 
aspects here. The physical and the philosophical aspects will have to wait until the next 
sections. 
To begin, most of the introductions to the mathematical tailoring of time reversal in QM 
resort on, at least, three interrelated assumptions. Let us use Θ to denote a general, still-
unspecified time-reversal transformation. 
A1. The Hamiltonian of the system is required to remain invariant under time reversal, 
Θ𝐻Θ−1 = 𝐻 (see Ballentine 1998: 380) 
A2. If the time evolution of a quantum state obeys time-reversal symmetry, then it is 
expected that if the state 𝛼, 𝑡 is a solution of the Schrödinger equation, then the time-
reversed state Θ𝛼, 𝑡 will also be a solution (Ballentine 1998: 280, Sakurai 2011: 290). 
This also means that the Θ-transformation must be such that the time-reversed state 
belongs to the same unitary function space (Sachs 1987: 36). 
A3. The time-reversal transformation is required to generate a reversal of motion (Bigi 
and Sanda 2016: 27), which imposes that Θ fits with the correspondence principles 
(Sachs 1987: 34).  
Any operator that meets these requirements will be a good candidate for a time-reversal 
transformation in QM. However, in order to give the right form of the transformation, we 
need to impose some further structure. It is worth stressing that the explicit form of Θ will 
depend upon the basis of the Hilbert space used to represent the state, so it must be considered 
separately in each case. To keep things as simple as possible, I will circumscribe myself to 
the coordinate representation, but I will occasionally introduce more general remarks when 
needed. 
One of the most intuitive features that our time-reversal transformation should possess is 
that it transforms the time coordinate as 𝑡 → −𝑡, which might fairly be seen as representing 
an intuitive inversion of the direction of time. However, in QM the association between such 
a transformation and the inversion of the direction of time is not so straightforward. To see 
why let us stick to this intuition to characterize Θ and see how far it takes us. Suppose a 
 
1 I will be mainly following Sakurai (2011: 289-293), Ballentine (1998: 380-381), Gasiorowicz (1966: 25-30) 
Gibson and Pollard (1978: 179-180). I will also introduce some insights from Bigi and Sand (2016: 27-30), 
Jauch (1959: 88-91), Sachs (1987: 32-36), and Messiah (1966: 664-674) 
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quantum state in the position basis, 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡), whose evolution is given by the Schrödinger 
equation: 
 𝐻𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑖ℏ
𝛿
𝛿𝑡
𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) (5) 
Suppose, too, that time-reversal is implemented by an operator such that 
 
Θ: 𝑡 → −𝑡 
Θ: 𝑥 → 𝑥 
(6) 
If Θ is a well-behaved time-reversal transformation, then it must satisfy the requirements A1-
A3. To start, it transforms the terms of the equation as follows: 
 Θ𝐻𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) = Θ𝑖ℏ
𝛿
𝛿𝑡
𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) (7) 
Θ leaves the i and ℏ unchanged. The operator  
𝛿
𝛿𝑡
 will change sign under Θ, Θ
𝛿
𝛿𝑡




since Θ: 𝑡 → −𝑡. The wavefunction 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) changes to 𝜓′(𝑥, 𝑡) Θ. These transformations 
yield the following equation: 
 Θ𝐻Θ−1𝜓′(𝑥, 𝑡) = −𝑖ℏ
𝛿
𝛿𝑡
𝜓′(𝑥, −𝑡) (8) 
Now, we have to figure out how the Hamiltonian transforms under Θ. Given A2, eq. 8 should 
be symmetric, which formally amounts to rendering both sides of the equation equal. Given 
A1, 𝜓′ must also be a solution of the Schrödinger equation. Both requirements, then, need 
that the Hamiltonian transforms as follows: 
 Θ𝐻Θ−1 = −𝐻 (9) 
This suggests that the Hamiltonian should transform its sign under Θ. In the literature, there 
are at least two ways to motivate the transformation (eq. 9). One of them has been given by 
Craig Callender (2000). According to him, the Hamiltonian is a first-time derivative in the 
Schrödinger equation (in its simplest form), so it is natural (or logical) that transforms its sign 
under time reversal2. The other answer is the one given in the previous paragraph: in order to 
keep the equation invariant (i.e., requirement A2) the Hamiltonian should change sign under 
time reversal (see Gasiorowicz 1966: 27), so that both sides on the eq. 8 have negative signs. 
 
2 This argument is troublesome because it somehow assumes that the Schrödinger equation defines the 
Hamiltonian, when in general it “is defined independently as an operator that acts on the x dependence of a state 
function” (see Laue 1996 for discussion). 
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So far, this is formally correct (for a more thorough proof see Sakurai 2011: 291; also, 
Bigi and Sanda 2016: 27). But if time-reversal symmetry is to make physical sense while 
accomplishing requirements A1-A3, eqs. 8 and 9 are unacceptable. The crucial problem here 
is that they imply that Θ changes the sign of the Hamiltonian. And these minus signs on both 
sides of eq. 8 necessarily appeared in there because we started off by assuming that time 
reversal was represented by Θ, which, when looked closely, is unitary and linear. So, the 
conclusion we have reached can be put in the following conditional form: if time-reversal 
symmetry is to make physical sense while accomplishing requirements A1-A3, then Θ cannot 
be unitary (Sakurai 2011: 291). Let us analyze the argument a bit more carefully.   
Basically, the argument is a reductio ad absurdum. It begins by assuming that Θ exists 
and satisfies A1-A3. If Θ is only given by eq. 6, then it is unitary and linear. If Θ is unitary 
and linear, then we are allowed to eliminate any c-number: 
 −𝑖𝐻Θ  = Θ𝑖𝐻  → −𝐻Θ  = Θ𝐻  (10) 
Consider now an eigenstate α of the Hamiltonian with eigenvalue 𝐸𝛼. The time-reversed 
state of α would be Θα. Plugging this into eq. 10, we obtain 
 𝐻Θα = −Θ𝐻α = (−E𝛼)Θα  (11) 
This means that Θα is an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian with eigenvalue −E𝛼, that is, with 
negative energies. This is problematic for many reasons, but the most important one (which 
I will develop a bit further in the next section) is that it explicitly violates A1, conforming to 
which the Hamiltonian is required to remain bounded-from-below but unbounded-from-
above after the transformation. So, no time-reversal transformation should change the 
Hamiltonian’s spectrum from positive to negative. So, the result that has been reached by 
assuming that Θ exists is unacceptable (or “nonsensical”, to borrow Sakurai’s wording). To 
put it differently, what this proof shows is that there exists no unitary time-reversal 
transformation that satisfies the requirements I numbered previously (see Jauchs 1959: 88), 
which strongly suggests that time reversal must be implemented by an operator that does not 
generate eq. 8 and 9.   
What to do then? We need to formally redefine the transformation that is to implement 
time reversal. We can do it by defining an anti-unitary operator, 𝒯, which can be easily done 
by involving complex conjugation 𝐾𝑧𝐾 = 𝑧∗, where z is a complex number and z* its 
complex conjugate3. If we come back to eq. 7, but we apply 𝒯, we see that the right-hand 
side of the equation becomes 
 
3 I am borrowing the notation ‘*’ to refer to complex conjugation from Ballentine 1998, Sachs 1987 and Gibson 
and Pollard 1978. 
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 𝒯𝐻𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝒯𝑖ℎ𝒯
𝛿
𝛿𝑡
𝒯𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) = 





𝒯 changes the sign of the operator  
𝛿
𝛿𝑡
 as Θ did, 𝒯
𝛿
𝛿𝑡
 𝒯−1 = −
𝛿
𝛿𝑡
. But now 𝒯 does transform 
the sign of i, since it is anti-unitary, 𝒯𝑖𝒯−1 = −𝑖. This eliminates the minus sign on the right 
side of the equation. Also, 𝒯 takes the complex conjugate over the wavefunction, 𝒯: 
𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡) → 𝜓∗(𝑥, −𝑡). We may notice now that, by simplifying and cancelling the is and the 
kets, the eq. 11 suggests that the Hamiltonian should transform as 
 𝒯𝐻𝒯−1 = 𝐻 (12) 
To satisfy A1 and A2. Now we are getting somewhere, since eq. 12 leaves the time-reversed 
Hamiltonian bounded-from-below (all its possible eigenvalues will be E𝑖 > 0). And this 
makes perfectly physical sense. 
This is, basically, the core of the mathematical tailoring of time reversal in QM, which 
comes down to the fact that it must be implemented by an antiunitary operator. This might 
be bit a surprise since we are accustomed to associating unitary transformations with 
physically interesting symmetry transformations. This is clearly not the case here where the 
rationale has led us to an antiunitary time-reversal transformation. But the reasons are quite 
strong. On the one hand, the preservation of transition probabilities allows an antiunitary 
operator to implement a symmetry transformation. On the other, if we want time reversal to 
be consistent with the kinematics and the dynamics of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, 
it seems we are forced to opt for an antiunitary implementation (Bigi and Sanda 2016: 27). 
To complete the section, let me review the requirements A1-A3 for 𝒯.  As I mentioned 
previously, the explicit form will depend ultimately on the basis of the Hilbert space, but if 
we express the Schrödinger equation in the coordinate basis as in eq. 5, we deduce from eqs. 
11 and 12 that 𝒯 delivers the following (time-reversed) Schrödinger equation 
 𝐻𝜓∗(𝑥, −𝑡) = 𝑖ℎ
𝛿
𝛿𝑡
𝜓∗(𝑥, −𝑡) (13) 
Which not only satisfies A1 (as previously shown), but also A2. If we look closely at 𝒯 in 
the coordinate representation, we will find that 𝒯 is just the complex conjugation for the 
general equation of a one-particle structureless system (see Ballentine 1998: 381; for a proof, 
see Sachs 1987: 39 and Bigi and Sanda 2016: 28) plus a re-parametrization of the t 
coordinate. 
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 𝒯 = 𝐾0 (14) 
Finally, the antiunitary operator 𝒯 also satisfies A3 since it leads to inverting the sign of the 
momentum operator and to leaving the position operator unchanged 
 
𝒯𝑃𝒯−1 = −𝑃 
𝒯𝑋𝒯−1 = 𝑋 
(15) 
To sum up, the mathematical tailoring of time reversal in QM is guided by the 
preservation of some classical features in the transformation, but also by satisfying some 
formal constraints (A1-A3) that make time reversal formally well-behaved in QM. Despite 
the soundness of the argumentation for an anti-unitary implementation of time reversal, some 
philosophers have casted some doubts on it. This “heretic” attitude basically comes down to 
a positive defense of a “more natural” way to formally represent time reversal in physics (see 
Albert 2000, Callender 2000. Costa de Beauregard 19804 also defends such a view in 
quantum field theory), which would consist in giving a unitary implementation, like Θ in eqs. 
6, 7 and 8.  
Even though this attitude might seem outrageously absurd from the formal point of view, 
I think it should be rightly framed: I do not think that the heretic attitude holds that there is 
some formal argument to back its thesis, or that there is some formal flaw in the orthodox 
approach. What I believe, and it is a fair point that ought to be seriously considered, is that 
its defenders rather want to move the discussion to a more conceptual terrain by claiming 
that a non-standard, heretic account would better capture the idea of time reversal. What they 
put into question, in brief, is the binding between the concept of time reversal and its orthodox 
implementation –even though 𝒯 is a well-behaved transformation, it does not implement time 
reversal, but something different. In fact, to a great extent, the persuasive force of the 
orthodoxy is grounded in accepting what it means by ‘time reversal’. What I submit is that 
the assumptions that the orthodoxy imposes on an implementation of time reversal (like A1-
A3) seeks to define time reversal physically and conceptually in terms of motion reversal, 
that is, in terms of retracing a system’s state to the original state. If we now accept this core 
idea, then the orthodoxy succeeds not simply because it provides the right sort of 
mathematical tailoring, but because such a core idea (once accepted) can successfully justify 
the mathematical tailoring on more solid grounds. 
My proposal for the rest is to view the orthodoxy as a chain of formal, physical and 
philosophical assumptions that articulate very well to yield a coherent view of time reversal. 
The mathematical tailoring is just the last link in the chain, which formally adapts, shapes, 
and implements a particular conceptualization of time reversal already at work. This 
 
4 Beauregard refers to “Racah’s operator” as opposed to Wigner’s (Costa de Beuregard 1980: 524 and further 
references therein). 
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conceptualization consists in construing time reversal in terms of backtracking (or motion 
reversal). The mathematical tailoring is sparklingly clean, providing good and sound reasons 
for time reversal to be anti-unitary. But, if we do not want to take this as self-evident or 
analytically true, we ought to provide a more careful justification of its assumptions along 
with the justification of why time reversal should be construed as motion reversal. 
3. The Physical Justification of the Orthodoxy 
We know that the orthodox understanding of time reversal seems somehow to be guided by 
the idea of backtracking. Yet, it is still unclear what this means exactly in physical terms 
within QM, and why the concept of time reversal must be conceived as the orthodoxy claims 
it must be. Though standard textbooks remain largely silent about these questions, literature 
on foundations and philosophy of physics has addressed them in some detail. Answers to 
these questions amounts to justifying the orthodox mathematical tailoring as well as its 
binding to the idea of backtracking. This justificatory task has probably its origins in the work 
of Eugene Wigner (1932), and it has been re-elaborated in the last decades (see, for instance, 
Sachs 1987, Earman 2002 and Roberts 2017).  
The justificatory task is not simple, though: in general, the justification proceeds in two 
steps. The first consists of at least two arguments aiming to show not only how the idea of 
time reversal as backtracking should be physically understood, but also that the mathematical 
tailoring as presented in Section 2 is the right, and the only possible, implementation. This is 
the physical justification and I will develop it along this section. The second step, which, to 
the best of my knowledge, has not been sufficiently recognized, consists in the philosophical 
reasons we might have to conceive time reversal as backtracking. This is what I call the 
philosophical background and I will address it in Section 4. 
Setting aside any classically rooted intuition on time reversal as backtracking, the details 
of what we physically mean by time reversal must be given within a theoretical framework. 
There are at least two key arguments5 upholding the orthodoxy, namely: 
• The ‘two time-evolution’ argument (or Wigner’s general criterion for time reversal) 
 
5 It can be pointed out that there is a third key argument, to wit, that momentum changes its sign under time 
reversal. Certainly, this is one of the most salient features of the time reversal implementation in classical 
mechanics. For the most part though, the reasons why the sign of momentum should change under time reversal 
in QM follow the lines of the other two arguments. In the particular case of momentum, reasons swing back 
and forth from preserving certain smooth continuity between the classical mechanics and QM to achieving the 
representation of motion and reversal and appealing to its obviousness. Some authors just claim that the 
transformation follows by definition (Messiah 1966: 667, Sachs 1987, Ballentine 1998: 377-378). A more 
philosophically refined discussion can be found in Callender (2000) and Roberts (2018). In addition, it can be 
argued that the transformation of momentum plays a paramount role in the semi-classical limit, mainly in 
relation to Ehrenfest’s theorem. However, this argument, and various versions thereof, does not add anything 
substantive to the point I want to make in this paper, so I will set it aside. 
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• The Hamilton’s spectrum argument 
3.1 The ‘two-time-evolution’ argument (or Wigner’s general criterion for time-
reversal) 
One of the distinctive properties of the time-reversal operator in general is that it is an 
involution. Mathematically, this means that when time reversal is applied twice, it is equal to 
the identity. Naturally, this is met by any operator that satisfies 𝑋2 = 𝐼, but this is not enough 
to get to the idea of backtracking a system’s state to its initial state. The locus classicus of 
this requirement is the work of Eugene Wigner. In his 1932 book, Group Theory and its 
Application to the Quantum Mechanics of Atomic Spectra, Wigner imposes a general 
criterion for time reversal stating that it is a transformation such that, when the following 
operations are sequentially performed, we obtain the identity. Informally,  
 time displacement by t  time reversal  time displacement by t  time reversal = I        
And more formally, 
 𝒯[𝑈∆𝑡2𝒯(𝑈∆𝑡1𝑠0)] = 𝑠0 (16) 
Where 𝑠0 is the initial state, and ∆𝑡1 = 𝑡1 − 𝑡2 = 𝑡2 − 𝑡1 = ∆𝑡2 
Wigner’s general criterion for a time reversal implementation evidently supposes further 
structure than a simple involution –the time reversal operator is expected to obtain the 
original state we started with after producing a time evolution with t increasing and by 
producing a (formally identical) second time evolution with t decreasing. In other words, the 
time-reversal operator is not only required to give us the same initial state when applied 
twice, but also to give us the same initial state after temporally evolving the system twice. 
This is a stronger requirement since the time-reversal transformation is expected to carry out 
the right sort of transformations to, at least, generate a time evolution with t decreasing. This 
twofold time evolution is not trivial and defines what a time-reversal transformation is. To 
put it into a slogan –to be a time-reversal operator is to be an operator that yields the identity 
after two-time evolutions. 
Wigner additionally establishes that any candidate for a time-reversal transformation has 
to preserve transition probabilities. 
 |⟨𝜓|𝜑⟩| = |⟨𝒯𝜓|𝒯𝜑⟩| (17) 
This requirement intuitively makes senses since, if it were not the case, the second time 
evolution would no longer be possible. More specifically, Wigner postulates that the 
transition probabilities between two states have an invariant physical sense, so any symmetry 
should preserve them. Therefore, if time reversal is a symmetry, it must preserve transition 
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probabilities. Yet, this justification only follows from the invariance under time reversal, and 
not from the time-reversal transformation itself. That is, if a symmetry holds, then transition 
probabilities must be preserved by the symmetry transformation. Clearly, this does not tell 
us whether a generic time reversal transformation should always preserve transitions 
probabilities6. 
How does all this relate to an anti-unitary representation of time reversal in QM? The 
famous Wigner’s theorem states that a symmetry transformation is represented either by a 
unitary or an anti-unitary operator. As the anti-unitary operator is the only one that 
satisfactorily meets the general criterion (eq. 16) and preserves transition probabilities, the 
unitary operator is discarded. However, it has been pointed out that Wigner’s proof of his 
theorem was “incomplete” (see Chevalier 2007: 429) and that a correct proof has been given 
by U. Uhlhorn in 1962, who also generalizes the condition of preserving the probabilities. In 
a nutshell, Uhlhorn’s proof replaces the preservation of the transition probabilities by the 
preservation of orthogonality: any pair of orthogonal states ⟨𝜓, 𝜑⟩ = 0 remains orthogonal 
under a symmetry transformation S, ⟨𝑆𝜓, 𝑆𝜑⟩ = 0. It follows from this that ⟨𝜓, 𝜑⟩ =
⟨𝑆𝜓, 𝑆𝜑⟩ (see Chevalier 2007, Section 5, for a proof of Uhlhorn’s theorem). For Chevalier, 
Uhlhorn generalizes Wigner’s proof as he shows that a symmetry transformation preserves 
the logical structure of a quantum theory, as Uhlhorn himself states in the Introduction of his 
book. 
Following the same logic as before, if time-reversal invariance holds, then any orthogonal 
pair of states remains orthogonal under time reversal, that is, if ⟨𝜓, 𝜑⟩ = 0, then ⟨𝑇𝜓, 𝑇𝜑⟩ =
0. But, once again, the justification hinges upon what we should expect from time-reversal 
invariance. Bryan Roberts (2017) notes that Uhlhorn’s theorem provides a general answer to 
why transition probabilities must be preserved under time reversal and advances a more 
convincing answer for why the time-reversal transformation ought to preserve transition 
probabilities. His argument is quite simple: orthogonality has nothing to do with time reversal 
since it simply relates to “what is possible in an experimental outcome, independently of their 
time development” (Roberts 2017: 321). So, why should we expect that something 
completely unrelated to time (as two states being mutually exclusive) be modified by time 
reversal?  
The argument is interesting because it concerns what we should expect from a time-
reversal transformation independently of whether it yields an invariance or not. It is worth 
bearing in mind that there is yet an assumption here: such implementation of time reversal is 
supposed to transform quantum-mechanical states into quantum mechanical states. Even 
though it is true that orthogonality has nothing to do with time reversal, it does have to do 
 
6 One could argue that a general time-reversal transformation will never change the sign of the position operator, 
because it is not the right sort of transformation that time reversal is expected to carry out. I do not find any 
equally stronger argument for transition probabilities, though Uhlhorn’s theorem could, after some assumptions, 
do the work (see below). 
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with the notion of state. The time-reversal transformation is then required to preserve the 
notion of quantum-mechanical state7. 
To sum up the “two-evolution-based argument”. The formal implementation of time 
reversal might take two forms: either unitary or anti-unitary. Naturally, we have a wide 
panoply of transformations that fills the bill. So, we need to narrow the possibilities down. 
Wigner’s general criterion is a first step toward such a direction, since it states that whatever 
the time reversal comes to be, it is a transformation such that it delivers the state we started 
with after a twofold application and two-time evolutions. As a subsidiary requirement, it is 
demanded to preserve orthogonality, and thereby, transition probabilities. 
3.2. The Hamiltonian’s spectrum argument 
In Section 2, I mentioned that one of the main virtues of the anti-unitary representation of 
time reversal is that it leaves the Hamiltonian invariant, 𝒯𝐇𝒯−1 = 𝐇. I will now expand on 
this requirement. As pointed out above, this requirement is essential for upholding the 
orthodoxy (in addition to references in Section 2, see also Sachs 1987: 36). As the 
Hamiltonian represents the energy of the system, its spectrum is supposed to be always 
positive. Yet, it was shown that a unitary and linear implementation of time reversal (Θ in 
Section 2) should bring about a minus sign on the right side of eq. 8, in order to accomplish 
A1-A3. This led us to the following: if |𝛼⟩ is an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian with energy 
𝐸, then the temporally reversed eigenstate Θ|𝛼⟩ should involve negative energies, – 𝐸𝛼, that 
is, the quantum state would evolve backwards displaying negative energies8. The upshot was 
that if this is so, the time-reversal transformation does not make sense in QM. But we believe 
that the time-reversal transformation makes sense in QM. Therefore, Θ cannot exist. It is 
 
7 From a philosophical viewpoint, I think it is not trivial. Even though most symmetries physicists are interested 
in are required at minimum to transform states into states, we could want to leave some room for metaphysically 
possible scenarios in which some transformation fails to transform a state into a physical state. Primitivists with 
respect to time could argue that time is fundamental and defines not only the dynamics of a physical theory, but 
also is constitutive of its kinematics. Consider, for instance, Maudlin’s argument about doppelgängers and 
mental states (Maudlin 2002: 271): if we suppose that time reversal acts in such a way that the time-reversed 
mental states are still mental states, we are unjustifiably assuming that the direction of time does not play any 
role in making a mental state what it is. How do we know that when reversing time, we will still end up with 
something like mental states, and not something completely different?  An analogous argument, I think, can be 
run here: Why should the substantivalist assume that time does not play a role in defining what is a physical 
state? Does the requirement of preserving the notion of state when time is reversed not discard, from the outset, 
the notion of time as fundamental? I am not defending this viewpoint here, but I just want to draw the attention 
towards the non-obviousness of the assumption from a metaphysical viewpoint. 
8 It is worth clarifying that the predicates “positive” or “negative” for the energy spectrum, or “unbounded from 
below/from above” for Hamiltonians are conventional. So, the argument could not hinge upon which predicate 
we adopt to describe the system properly. The problem is not exactly whether the Hamiltonian is unbounded 
from below. The problem is that if we start with a Hamiltonian unbounded from above (but bounded from 
below) and end up with a Hamiltonian unbounded from below (but bounded from above) after a transformation. 
A specific Hamiltonian must be bounded (either from above or from below), and the problem will come up if 
one adopts a transformation that turns a Hamiltonian unbounded from above (bounded from below) into a 
Hamiltonian unbounded from below (bounded from above). 
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clear that the argument hinges upon the relation between a meaningful notion of time 
reversal, the spectrum condition, and the Wigner’s general criterion. 
The connection is relatively straightforward. If Hamiltonians must be always bounded 
from below, the second time translation with t decreasing must be generated by a bounded-
from-below Hamiltonian. Otherwise, the time translation would be “physically meaningless” 
since it would involve eigenstates of the Hamiltonian whose spectrum is unbounded from 
below. Putting it drastically, unbounded-from-below Hamiltonians must not even be 
considered as quantum-mechanics systems. Therefore, the implementation of time reversal 
is demanded not only to generate a second time evolution with t decreasing, but also to 
generate a quantum mechanical second time evolution, which would be generated by a time-
reversed 𝐻. Otherwise, Wigner’s general criterion could not be applied since the second time 
translation could never be brought about. It is worth noting how this argument strengthens 
not only A1 in the mathematical tailoring, but also A2 and A3 –the Θ-transformation could 
never transform solutions of the Schrödinger equation into time-reversed solutions, and it 
will thereby systematically fail to generate motion reversal. If we implement time reversal 
through some operator like Θ, it follows that the time-reversal transformation does not make 
physical sense This just stresses the necessity of relying on an anti-unitary representation of 
time reversal. 
Roberts (2017) also offers a well-grounded argument for the requirement that the 
Hamiltonian’s spectrum must remain invariant under time reversal. He begins by claiming 
that “all known Hamiltonians describing realistic quantum systems are bounded from below, 
which we will express by choosing a lower bound of 0 ≤ (𝜓, 𝐻𝜓)”  (2017: 326). This can 
be empirically justified, at least partially: negative energies would turn matter unstable, but 
as matter looks reasonably stable, we would have good reasons to suppose that either negative 
energies do not exist (at least, within QM), or they remain undetected. This fact seems to be 
promoted to a general condition that a time-reversal operator must meet for its acceptability, 
meaning that ⟨𝜓, 𝐻𝜓⟩ and ⟨𝑇𝜓, 𝑇𝐻𝜓⟩ must be both non-negatives, as I specified above. Next, 
Roberts demands that there is at least “one realistic dynamical system” that satisfies time-
reversal invariance in the sense that satisfies 𝑇𝑒𝑖𝑡𝐻𝜓 = 𝑒−𝑖𝑡𝐻𝑇𝜓. Roberts makes the point 
that the time-reversal operator is demanded to be anti-unitary in order to meet these 
requirements, so for reductio, he assumes that such an operator is unitary, that is, that 𝑇 = Θ. 
This leads to 𝑖𝑡𝐻 = −𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐻𝑇−1 and thus to 𝑇𝐇𝑇−1 = −𝐻. What we finally get is 0 ≤
⟨𝜓, 𝐻𝜓⟩ = −⟨𝑇𝜓, 𝑇𝐻𝜓⟩  ≤ 0, which forces us to either accept that the Hamiltonian is 
unbounded from below (what he had previously ruled out) or that the Hamiltonian is the 
operator zero, which renders triviality. Therefore, by reductio, the time-reversal operator 
cannot be unitary but anti-unitary, 𝑇 = 𝒯. 
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4. The Philosophical Background of the Orthodoxy 
Let me briefly summarize what I have shown so far. First, I outlined the mathematical 
tailoring of time reversal in QM according to the orthodoxy. What we learnt from it is that 
time reversal must be given by an anti-unitary implementation. Even though it differs from 
how time reversal is thought of in Hamiltonian classical mechanics, it captures a notion of 
time reversal that both transformations share –time reversal is implemented by tracing the 
state of a system back to the initial state. I claimed that the justification of the mathematical 
tailoring could not be purely formal, but it required some physical and conceptual 
background. This has been partially carried out in Section 3 by laying the physical 
foundations of time reversal as backtracking in QM. Regardless how much satisfactory this 
justification may be, a question remains: what entitles us to conceive of time reversal as 
backtracking in the first place? In other words, what is the philosophical background 
upholding the association between time reversal and backtracking? In this section I will 
address these philosophical aspects. 
In my proposal, the philosophical background is a second step in the conceptual 
justification of the orthodoxy in QM. What I will argue is that this philosophical background 
mainly consists of two pillars: 
• Temporal relationalism, which motivates a functional reductionist approach to time 
reversal in terms of motion reversal. 
• The by-stipulation view on symmetries, which postulates that fundamental equations 
of motion must remain invariant under time reversal. 
Before getting into the details, it is worth stressing the role that this philosophical background 
plays in the discussion about time reversal in QM as I framed it. My main claim is that the 
orthodoxy finds a friendly environment in such a philosophical background, which sensibly 
strengths its persuasive force when recognized. To put it differently, if temporal relationalism 
and the by-stipulation view on symmetries are adopted, then the orthodoxy comes out as a 
natural, and conceptually powerful, approach to time reversal in QM. The philosophical 
question that emerges from the physical justification is why we are entitled to call a specific 
piece of mathematics ‘time reversal’. The mathematical tailoring, of course, does not provide 
such an answer and the physical justification simply assumes it by stating that time reversal 
must capture the idea of backtracking. The philosophical background provides the right sort 
of tools to answer this question in a conceptually clean and persuasive way. 
Naturally, this does not entail that anyone supporting the orthodoxy ought to embrace 
temporal relationalism or the by-stipulation view. Neither does it mean that the orthodoxy 
necessarily requires temporal relationalism or a by-stipulation view. This would be stronger 
than what I will hold here. To see this more clearly, take for instance temporal relationalism, 
which defends the reduction of time reversal to motion reversal. My claim is that there is a 
conceptually straightforward way to go from temporal relationalism to the justification of 
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time reversal as backtracking, and from here to the orthodoxy’s physical justification. To the 
contrary, I find that there is not the same conceptually straightforward way to make the route 
from temporal substantivalism, because it is not prima facie obvious that time reversal 
reduces to motion reversal in this framework to begin. This, of course, does not mean that 
temporal substantivalism ought to reject the orthodoxy, because it can always find the way 
to relate time reversal to motion reversal, even though this relation might not be reductive9. 
In any case, if I am right on this, the burden is now on the temporal substantivalist: she should 
provide an account that can make sense of the orthodoxy within a temporal substantivalist 
framework, by showing which specific relations connect time reversal with motion reversal. 
In the end, this might redound to imposing a more complex structure that can eventually 
favor temporal relationalism for simplicity. 
Then, the philosophical background could well play a twofold role. First, it benefits the 
orthodoxy since it provides the right conceptual framework to justify many of its 
assumptions. Second, it can be seen as an argument in favor of relationalism and of the by-
stipulation view, since it naturally articulates with the mathematics and the physics that the 
orthodoxy develops. 
4.1 Leibniz meets time reversal at the Plank scale. 
My first thesis is that temporal relationalism lays the conceptual groundwork for a 
straightforward philosophical justification of the orthodoxy, since it easily connects time 
reversal with motion reversal (i.e., with the notion of backtracking). The key here to achieve 
this connection is the functional reduction of time reversal in terms of motion reversal. 
Relationalism was famously championed by Leibniz. In his third letter to Samuel Clarke 
(dated February 25, 1716), he claimed that: 
“what that argument really proves is that times, considered without the things or 
events, are nothing at all, and that they consist only in the successive order of 
things and events”  
Our philosophical understanding of time plays a role in our conceptual understanding of time 
reversal –If we are said to invert the direction of time, it seems at least reasonable to suppose 
that our course of actions will be different depending on what we understand by ‘time’. And 
in this sense our metaphysics of time comes first: It determines not only what time reversal 
is but also upon what it is meant to act. The relationalist, hence, is committed to 
understanding time reversal in a particular way according to her metaphysical principles. 
There are many different types of relationalist-like views in metaphysics and in 
philosophy of physics that, in general, share the idea that time is nothing over and above 
temporal relations among events and things (Benovsky 2010: 492), though they can greatly 
vary on which it is considered as objective and fundamental in the physical world (see Sklar 
 
9 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation 
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1974, Earman 1989, Pooley 2013, for comprehensive overviews of the different kinds of 
relationalisms). To keep things simple, I will consider temporal relationalism as holding two 
tenets: 
R1 A monist ontology. There are only events or physical bodies in the world and 
their temporal relations.  
R2 A reductionist attitude. Time is nothing but change. The sort of relation 
between the physical world and the concept of ‘time’ is that of a Leibnizian 
representation or a Machian abstraction: time is an ideal, unreal entity 
parasitic on events-things’ changing. 
According to these tenets, the variable t occurring in most physical theories (setting aside 
general relativity) is merely an external and unreal parameter, which should not be taken as 
representing anything with physical meaning. In this sense, temporal relationalism implies 
some reductionist attitude toward temporal predicates. For instance, any reference to the 
‘directionality of time’ should not be taken literally as if there were some primitive entity 
exemplifying the property of having a directionality. Rather, it should be taken 
metaphorically –the ‘directionality of time’ boils down to the directionality of the change of 
a series of temporal relations held by their relata. 
One of the lessons we can take from these tenets is that time reversal should not be taken 
literally, as if it were a transformation of time itself (whatever it might mean in physical 
terms). In fact, the parlance of time reversal in physics and philosophy of physics is mostly 
metaphorical (see, for instance, Wigner 1932: 325, Gibson and Pollard 1976: 177, Ballentine 
1998: 377, among many others). The task for the philosophical reflection on time and time 
reversal is thus to conceptually articulate the underlying notions and elements converging 
into the idea of time reversal as orthodoxly understood. So, relationalism makes coherent a 
series of assumptions and elements that build up the orthodoxy. 
By focusing on the second tenet, we see that the 𝑡 → −𝑡 transformation (one of the, 
intuitively, most salient features of time reversal) must not be taken too seriously. It would 
be naïve, according to temporal relationalism, to take 𝑡 → −𝑡 as performing a physically 
relevant action upon dynamical equations. What is really substantive in the understanding of 
time reversal is not the transformation of 𝑡, but the transformation of change. This suggests 
that time reversal should be considered simply as a “shortcut” standing for dynamically 
relevant transformations related to the change (or motion) of a system. To put it in a slogan, 
when it comes to time reversal, temporal relationalism holds that time reversal is nothing but 
change (or motion) reversal. This is the overarching concept grounding the physical 
justification and guiding to a good extent the mathematical tailoring: the formal 
representation ultimately seeks to capture the idea of reversing the change. The mathematical 
tailoring’s task is then to identify those elements that represent change within each theory 
and to transform them in the right way. 
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So, we can postulate as a general scheme the following properties of a relational view on 
time reversal 
𝑻𝐑𝐞𝐥  (a) A mere re-parametrization of t by 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡, for any general time reversal. 
(b) A change of all dynamically relevant magnitudes so as to generate a 
backward evolution, which is expressed by extensionally specifying the 
dynamically relevant transformations to take a system back to its original 
state. 
The physically substantive part is given by the property (b), which genuinely generates the 
symmetry transformation. And it is important to highlight that the two physical justifications 
I laid out in Section 3 are philosophically based on this property: it motivates why certain 
observable has to transform in a specific way to generate the relevant symmetry 
transformation, namely, time reversal as motion reversal.  
The second property can be clarified by proposing a sort of functionalist reduction of 
time reversal to motion reversal. Such an analysis will show how motion reversal realizes 
time reversal. The literature on functionalism (and, particularly, functional reduction) is 
abundant, so I will not get into details here. In general, it has mainly focused on either the 
relation between the mental and the physical in philosophy of mind, or the relations between 
high-order properties used in special sciences and low-order properties more frequent in 
physics. What I propose here is not a strict functional reduction as the one discussed in 
philosophy of mind or general philosophy of science, but a style of reasoning which can quite 
well capture the metaphysical and epistemic relations holding between time reversal and 
motion reversal in physics (for a functionalist approach in philosophy of physics, see for 
instance, Knox 2018). 
The overall idea is that motion reversal (and those properties attached to it) realizes time 
reversal (and thus all those subsidiary properties attached to it). In particular, the notion of 
time reversal is functionally reduced to the idea of ‘backtracking’, in the sense that ‘time 
reversal’ refers to dynamical realizers that play the role of retracing a system’s state to its 
origin. So, we can rephrase this by saying that if the state of a system has been “time-
reversed”, or that the history of a system has been “time-reversed”, we have to find the 
realizers of such a state and such a history in terms of the dynamical operations that 
effectively generate a backtracking process. From an abstract perspective, the notion of time 
reversal is simply a placeholder, whose occupants will be those realizers playing the role of 
retracing a system’s state to its origin. The problem of working out the right form of the time-
reversal transformation is that of working out the right realizers within a specific physical 
theory. 
The idea could be developed even further by offering the Ramsey sentence of time 
reversal, which has the structure  
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∃𝑋, ∃𝑌, ∃𝑍 (… 𝑋 … 𝑌 … 𝑍) 
What we know is that the notion of backtracking or (change) motion reversal realizes the 
notion of time reversal. What we have to do now is to supply the roles of each key players 
(X, Y and Z) and to identify which specific transformations within a particular physical 
theory play each role. This realizes Ramsey sentence consequently. Then, in order to apply 
time reversal properly, we have to provide the ordered n-tuple of realizers within a physical 
theory that satisfies the Ramsey sentence for time reversal. 
Under this framework, we could either adopt an eliminativist or conservative attitude. 
The eliminativist will be prone to simply eradicating any temporal predicate and structure in 
favor of predicates and structures exclusively referring to change. This would automatically 
remove temporal predicates from the physical picture when we want to be rigorous about 
what we are really doing when time reversing an equation of motion or a physical system. 
The term ‘time reversal’ is just flatus vocis (see Rovelli 2004 for such a radical attitude with 
respect to time). The conservative reductionist will be rather prone to preserving some 
temporal predicates and structures, though acknowledging their actual realizers relate to 
change. This view better preserves the classical Leibnizian-Machian framework, where 
durations are relative, time is essentially change, but other traditional temporal structures 
remain absolute (see Gryb and Thébault 2016 for a defense of this more conservative 
relationalism in quantum gravity). 
When we center in the physical justification of the orthodoxy, we see how the relational 
view on time-reversal can explain in a natural way why we should understand time reversal 
as a two-time evolution, basing Wigner’s general criterion. If time reversal is functionally 
realized by motion reversal, then any fair formal implementation of it has to pose the enough 
structure to represent the reversion of motion. In Wigner’s general criterion, this is provided 
by guaranteeing that the time(-motion)-reversal transformation generates a second time 
translation that takes the evolution of the state back to its origin. Otherwise, the 
implementation of time(-motion) reversal fails to genuinely capture the idea of backtracking. 
But what entitles us to metaphysically relate time reversal to motion reversal is temporal 
relationalism. This is done by providing the adequate conceptual framework to articulate the 
mathematics and the physics in a coherent approach to time reversal. It is worth emphasizing 
that the persuasive force of the orthodoxy does not hinge only upon the mathematical 
tailoring (as often argued when discarding alternative implementations of time reversal), but 
also upon one’s underlying metaphysics –it is this final step in the justification which entitles 
us to draw the right sort of conceptual connections. 
The same tenets also ground the Hamilton’s spectrum argument I presented in Sub-
section 3.2. Consider the following counterargument, based on Callender (2000)’s argument: 
The Hamiltonian is a first-time derivative magnitude, so it is natural to expect the 
Hamiltonian to change its sign under time reversal, which would lead to transforming a 
bounded-from-below Hamiltonian into an unbounded-from-below Hamiltonian (see fn. 2 for 
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concerns). However, from a relational viewpoint the demand is excessive, even if formal and 
physical considerations are put momently aside. Whether physical magnitudes are 
canonically defined as first-time derivative does not play any substantive role in defining 
time reversal, because we are not conceptually interested in t. We should instead focus on 
elucidating what role such physical magnitudes play in the evolution of the state and what 
role they should play if the evolution were reversed. The conceptualization of time reversal 
at a physical level precisely attempt to work that out. From a conceptual viewpoint, the real 
issue is not whether or not it makes sense that the Hamiltonian changes its sign under time 
reversal, but whether such a transformation plays any role in formally implementing time 
reversal as backtracking. Clearly, it does not. This explains why the unitary transformation 
must be discarded, even under the implausible assumption that they might make 
mathematical and physical sense. 
To emphasize my point. Temporal relationalism offers us a straightforward way to 
understand time reversal as conceived and formally implemented by the orthodoxy –it 
underpins, in a simple way, the underlying assumption that time reversal is just to track a 
system back to its initial state. For the sake of the argument, let us briefly consider the matter 
from the opposite view. Suppose now that time is a primitive substance independent of 
motion, a lá Newton. Time reversal should hence amount to a transformation of the intrinsic 
direction of such a substance. Within this view, there are no prima facie metaphysical reasons 
to identify motion reversal with time reversal, because they are different kinds of things. 
Therefore, there are no prima facie conceptual reasons to formally implement time reversal 
as it was recommended by Wigner’s criterion. Whoever wants to hold the orthodoxy 
approach to time reversal in QM and temporal substantivalism should then provide us an 
account that shows how the justification of the orthodoxy can be achieved. This, I guess, can 
be done in different ways, but it would demand imposing further conceptual structure to get 
the connection between time reversal and motion reversal properly justified. What we miss 
in changing the metaphysical framework is the straightforward connection between time 
reversal and motion reversal we get from temporal relationalism. Without such a connection, 
the persuasive force of the orthodoxy sensibly diminishes.  
Another virtue of relationalism when it comes to justifying the orthodoxy relates to the 
bridge that it builds with the empirical work. The substantivalist could insist on pointing out 
that we are still not allowed to call a piece of mathematics, as 𝒯, ‘time reversal’, because it 
is implementing a different sort of transformation, namely, motion reversal. In the end, all 
we were just confused about names and concepts all along –the empirical information that 
physicists have been gathering so far in terms of time reversal has just been information about 
motion reversal A reply to the substantivalist could go in the following line. Even though 
from a strict substantivalist framework such a situation is possible, she has to accept that 
when we test time reversal, we always test motion reversal. And now the substantivalist faces 
an uncomfortable dilemma: either she gives us the way to test time reversal independently 
from motion reversal, or she declares time reversal untestable. The first option puts the 
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burden on her, and we can just wait the answer. The second one forces her to provide further 
reasons of why an untestable symmetry transformation (i.e., time reversal as independent 
from motion reversal) should be preserved in our physical theories. In fact, it is similar to the 
case when we find redundant structure in our physical theory. By epistemic reasons (i.e., 
parsimony), we could just eliminate the redundant structure. In the end, the defense of the 
independency of time reversal would be self-defeating. 
Whether the orthodoxy can be justified in a non-relational framework deserves, of course, 
much more work. My aim here is not to be exhaustive about the possible connection, but to 
show that temporal relationalism can make a case for the orthodoxy in a natural way. In 
addition, this also suggest that the orthodoxy might have been guided by relational intuitions 
when developing the mathematical tailoring and the physical justification. The contrast in 
the previous paragraph just shows some of the difficulties that an alternative philosophical 
background could face. If for any reason we reject any of the relationalist tenets, the physical 
justification of time reversal loses much of its persuasive force, dragging naturally down the 
anti-unitary representation of time reversal. This emphasizes the relevance of the 
metaphysical background for the orthodoxy –it is not merely an uncommitted defense of a 
particular mathematical tailoring, but a well-articulated general view on time reversal. 
Temporal relationalism is one of its pillars since it provides the adequate framework to build 
a robust and powerful conceptual justification of why time reversal should be thought of as 
backtracking. 
4.2. Time-Reversal Invariance: by-stipulation or by-discovery 
In the previous section, I focused on the metaphysical pillar of the orthodoxy. In this section, 
I will focus on the second pillar, which concerns epistemic and heuristic aspects of time-
reversal symmetry in QM. Whereas the first pillar chiefly centered in the time-reversal 
transformation (what we metaphysically and physically mean by ‘time reversing’), the 
second pillar rather centers in the status of symmetries in physics. To be precise, it centers in 
the epistemic and heuristic aspects that connect the construction of a time-reversal 
transformation to the role that the time-reversal symmetry should play in a physical theory.  
There are at least two opposing views on space-time symmetries in modern physics. One 
of them, which I will call by-stipulation, takes symmetries as postulated, being true 
independently of the details of the dynamics. The other, which I will call by-discovery, takes 
symmetries as a result of the details of the dynamics. In the former case, symmetries are 
principles that constrain the dynamics. In the latter, symmetries are derived from it. As time-
reversal is prima facie a space-time symmetry, both views are also present in this case. What 
I will argue is that the orthodoxy can benefit from the by-stipulation view of time-reversal 
invariance, which offers, to a great extent, support to the physical justifications of an anti-
unitary implementation. 
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What does justify the distinction between by-stipulation and by-discovery symmetries? 
Katherine Brading and Elena Castellani show that space-time symmetries are sometimes 
thought of as guides to theory construction. That is, principles that must be satisfied whatever 
the final details of the theory come to be. The mechanism whereby a symmetry is raised to a 
must-satisfied principle is that of stipulation –we postulate, independently of the details of a 
theory’s dynamics, that a given symmetry holds, then the dynamics adapts to the symmetries’ 
constraints. When laying the groundwork for Bohmian Mechanics, Dettlef Dürr and Stephan 
Teufel for instance write 
“A symmetry can be a priori, i.e., the physical law is built in such a way that it 
respects that particular symmetry by construction. This is exemplified by 
spacetime symmetries, because spacetime is the theater in which the physical law 
acts (as long as spacetime is not subject to a law itself, as in general relativity, 
which we exclude from our considerations here), and must therefore respect the 
rules of the theater”. (2009: 43-44)  
It is worth contrasting this quote to others we can find in the literature on symmetries. 
John Earman says 
“The received wisdom about the status of symmetry principles has it that one 
must confront a choice between the a posteriori approach (a.k.a. the bottom-up 
approach) versus the a priori approach (a.k.a. the top-down approach)”. (2004: 
1230) 
Earman’s distinction goes along with that of Brading and Castellani’s (2007): whereas some 
take symmetries as postulated, guiding theory construction, others follow an opposite trend, 
according to which symmetries are a consequence of specific laws –like a discovery (2007: 
1347). The idea of postulating a symmetry is normative, suggesting certain degree of 
necessity: a theory’s dynamics must satisfy the symmetry principles, even though if the 
dynamics had been different. This gives symmetry principles certain modal robustness (or 
counterfactual robustness, see Lange 2009), entailed by its normative nature. 
Who denies that symmetries have such normative nature is prone to regard symmetries 
as a property of dynamics. In this line, Earman says:  
“it would seem that the symmetry transformation could not fail to be a true 
symmetry of nature, contradicting the usual understanding that symmetry 
principles are contingent, that is, are true (or false) without being necessarily true 
(or false)” (1989: 121) 
We hence come to know which symmetries a theory has by investigating the formal relations 
held by the elements in differential equations. Remarkably, this approach was followed by 
Isaac Newton in formulating classical mechanics in the Principia as the relativity principle 
appears as a corollary of the equations of motion (Corollary 5, see also Brading and Castellani 
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2003: 6) and by Joseph Lagrange (1811: 241). In this sense, a space-time symmetry plays a 
descriptive role, rather than a normative one. 
To write all this out neatly, both approaches can be defined as follows. For a general 
space-time symmetry 𝜎: 
By-stipulation approach 𝜎-symmetry plays a normative role in a theory’s dynamics and 
it must thereby be regarded as a priori and necessary for a 
theory T. 
By-discovery approach 𝜎-symmetry plays a descriptive role, and it must thereby be 
regarded as a posteriori and contingent for a theory T. 
It is worth remarking that the epistemic notions of “a priori/a posteriori” should be 
understood not in the traditional sense (independent or not of the experience), but in relation 
to a theory’s dynamics: whether 𝜎-symmetry is known independently of a theory’s laws. 
Time-reversal invariance can be regarded from both approaches. My claim is that, if the 
by-stipulation view on symmetries is adopted, the orthodoxy is the natural approach to time 
reversal in QM. If we look at the orthodoxy closely, we can identify some assumptions giving 
support to the by-stipulation view since they play a normative role in the theory construction 
as well as in the mathematical tailoring of the time-reversal transformation. To illustrate this, 
Robert Sachs says: 
“In order to express explicitly the independence between the kinematics and the 
nature of the forces, we require that the transformations leave the equations of 
motion invariant when all forces or interactions vanish” (Sachs 1987: 7) 
Time-reversal symmetry is required to hold by stipulation in the case of the free Schrödinger 
equation, that is, in the evolution of free-interaction quantum systems. This idea nicely comes 
along with the “theater picture” of Dürr and Teufel: the simplest systems’ dynamics reflect 
genuinely the structure of the theater, both its asymmetries and symmetries. But such a 
structure is pre-existent and independent of the dynamics, playing the role of setting the 
(space)-time background for all models of the theory and of individuating the nature of 
forces, interactions, and the various structures (for instance, asymmetries) they generate. 
To strength this point, let us briefly move to a different theory –classical 
electromagnetism. In discussing the mathematical form of the time-reversal transformation, 
Frank Arntzenius and Hillary Greaves (2009) claim that a widespread account, which they 
call ‘the textbook’s account’, proceeds as follows (see also Peterson 2015): 
 “Next let us consider the electric and magnetic fields. How do they transform 
under time reversal? Well, the standard procedure is simply to assume that 
classical electromagnetism is invariant under time reversal. From this 
assumption of time reversal invariance of the theory (…) it is inferred that the 
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electric field E is invariant under time reversal (…)” (Arntzenius and Greaves 
2009: 6. Italics mine) 
The same mechanisms, mutatis mutandis, seems to be guiding the orthodoxy in QM. Indeed, 
the stipulation of time-reversal invariance is just the assumption A2, which easily justifies 
why the implementation of time reversal in QM must be anti-unitary. This is more evident 
when we contrast with the unitary implementation: If we previously presume that time-
reversal invariance holds, then the formal implementation of time reversal cannot be one that 
make the free Schrödinger equation non-time-reversal invariant. Such a result would be in 
fact at odds with Sachs’ quote too: we, for instance, stipulate that the free Schrödinger 
equation is time reversal invariant in order to express the independence between dynamics 
and kinematics. Hence, its stipulation plays a heuristic role in our understanding of the theory, 
which we will be missed if the unitary transformation is rather adopted. So, everything 
converges at the same place: the anti-unitary operator emerges as the right implementation 
that carries out the sort of required transformations to keep the free Schrödinger equation 
invariant (A2), satisfying the epistemic and heuristic stipulation. 
This by-stipulation view on symmetries and the implied justificatory mechanism can be 
also regarded from a different angle. The stipulation of time-reversal invariance also appears 
as a premise in Wigner’s definition of time reversal in Section 3. He invokes two explicit 
premises:  
1. that a suitable time-reversal transformation must be able to restore “the system to its 
original state” (1932: 326), 
2. and that time inversion must flip the direction of momentum to compensate for the 
twofold application of T in Wigner’s general criterion.  
But there is also one fundamental implicit assumption: 
3. for a time-reversal transformation to be well-defined (and to exist at all), the second 
time translation (from 𝑡2 to 𝑡1) must also be physically possible.  
To see how this last assumption works let us suppose that a quantum state |𝜓⟩ evolves from 
𝑡1 to 𝑡2, according to the Schrödinger equation (first time translation). At 𝑡2, time reversal is 
applied upon the Schrödinger equation. If the time-reversal transformation is well-defined, 
then the time-reversed state 𝑇|𝜓⟩ should evolve from 𝑡2 to 𝑡1 also conforming with the 
Schrödinger equation (second time translation). And here the implicit assumption comes in. 
According to Wigner, the operation to be applied upon the state at  𝑡2 must be of such a kind 
that yields a quantum-mechanical evolution –the transformation takes a solution of the free 
Schrödinger equation and transforms it into a solution of the free Schrödinger equation This 
is the standard definition of symmetry and the state that satisfies is 𝑇|𝜓⟩ = |𝜓∗⟩, where 𝑇 =
𝒯.  
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To complete the argument, suppose now that at 𝑡2, we apply a unitary time-reversal 
operator, 𝑇 = Θ. As remarked above, the free Schrödinger equation will not temporally 
translate the system back. But, even worse, the transformation will fail to generate the second 
time translation, turning a solution of the free Schrödinger equation into a non-solution. The 
metaphysical pillar of the orthodoxy shows that such a transformation is ill-conceived 
because it fails to represent time reversal as motion reversal. The by-stipulation symmetry 
view shows that such a transformation is ill-conceived because it makes the free Schrödinger 
equation non-time-reversal invariant, violating A2. As I commented before, whether we 
assume the by-stipulation or the by discovery view is motivated by various reasons, mainly 
concerning epistemic and heuristic features. Which view to take is not at issue here. What it 
is at issue is which one of these approaches can offer a straightforward, or more natural, 
justification of the orthodoxy. A commitment to the by-stipulation view imposes some 
constraints on the notion of symmetries that more directly leads us to the orthodoxy –the anti-
unitary representation easily suits in such a framework along with the potential theoretical 
virtues attached to it. 
It might seem, at first glance, that the by-stipulation view arbitrarily declares that a given 
dynamics is invariant, without any further justification. This might then be regarded as a 
drawback of the by-stipulation view and that the by-discovery view then flats out win. And 
if this is the case, then the orthodoxy would have to revise some of its assumptions in the 
light of the by-discovery framework. Yet, I think it is not the case when the role of 
symmetries in the by-stipulation view is adequately addressed and considered from a broader 
perspective. I do not have enough room to develop the possible epistemic ramifications of 
adopting the by-stipulation view in detail, but here goes a hint of what, I think, is happening. 
Time-reversal invariance is a property expressed by dynamical equations of motion, 
either a stipulated or discovered property. If we think of dynamical equations of motion as 
representing some primitive modality in the world, or at least some modally robust pattern, 
one is committed to squaring time-reversal invariance within such a framework. This could 
lead to consider time-reversal invariance as also expressing a (modal) property of the world. 
However, this might sound a bit odd: We come to know something substantial about the 
world by means of a stipulation. Further argumentation would then be required, which would 
place the by-discovery view in some advantage. However, this is not the only way to go. 
Neither is it the best way to go.  
Instead of assuming that time-reversal invariance is a stipulated property of dynamical 
equations that express some laws of nature, we could hold a deflationary view on symmetries, 
conforming to which time-reversal invariance is a stipulated property of scientific laws 
understood as sentences in an axiomatic system. Therefore, symmetries are just theoretical 
postulates seeking for a better equilibrium between simplicity and informativeness. So, the 
motivation of stipulating a symmetry like time reversal is fundamentally representational and 
should be judged in such terms: We declare that general (or fundamental) dynamical 
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equations are time-reversal invariant because it is a representational advantage to do it so –a 
time-reversal invariant dynamic just turns out to be simpler and more informative than non-
time-reversal invariant ones.  So, symmetries so understood square perfectly within the so-
called Best System Approach (see Lewis 1973, Ramsey 1978, Loewer 1996 and Cohen and 
Callender 2009), which suggests us not to consider scientific laws, and symmetries I would 
add, as referring to some primitive modality in the world, but just playing a theoretical role 
striving for simplicity and informativeness. If symmetries are considered from this angle, the 
by-discovery view does not flat out win, but quite the opposite: the burden of the proof is on 
its side, since it has to show that symmetries have a more robust status in physical theories 
than the one given by a deflationary view. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper I have offered novel insights to address the debate on time reversal in QM. I 
began by distinguishing three steps in construing the orthodoxy: the mathematical tailoring 
(Section 2), the physical justification (Section 3), and the philosophical background (Section 
4). Each step was shown to be supported by an underlying one: the mathematical tailoring 
depends on its physical justification, which in turn relies on a philosophical background. The 
general aim was to bring to light the relevance of the philosophical background as a series of 
philosophical commitments from which the orthodoxy can sensibly benefit, once recognized, 
and made explicit. With respect to this, I have claimed that the orthodoxy is philosophically 
supported by two pillars:  
• temporal relationalism, which promotes a functionalist reduction of time reversal in 
terms of motion reversal 
• the by-stipulation view of time-reversal invariance 
What this primarily shows is that the orthodoxy is not philosophically neutral, but it can be 
successfully articulated, and properly justified, when a series of metaphysical, epistemic and 
heuristic commitments are taken into account. These play a major justificatory role in the 
anti-unitary implementation of time reversal in QM. Contrarily to how the debate has 
developed thus far, the quid of the notion of time reversal in QM should not be primarily 
framed in terms of whether it ought to be anti-unitary or unitary, but if we have well-grounded 
reasons to call a piece of mathematics, as 𝒯, ‘time reversal’. This, when we looked at the 
physical justification, came down to the idea of thinking of time reversal in terms of motion 
reversal. Temporal relationalism and the by-stipulation view on symmetries came in to 
cement this connection, transmitting the justification all the way up in the chain. 
So, what grounds the claim that a quantum system has been genuinely time reversed is a 
well-articulated view that is not simple, but quite complex, involving various mathematical, 
physical and, fundamentally, philosophical assumptions. The latter directly relate to big 
questions such as the nature of time and symmetries in physics in metaphysics, around which 
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philosophers and scientist have long been gravitating. And it is such philosophical 
complexity what feeds the orthodoxy’s persuasive force, rather than any seemingly 
obviousness or self-evident truth. 
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